cybergibbons

TBH, I would prefer self-certified, as it shows that self-certification isn't all it's cracked up to be. Is it possible to tell what has been done? To be blunt, I don't understand how some alarms are standards compliant as they just don't seem to detect jamming.

Thanks. Cheap as well!

I'd like to properly demonstate that graded wireless alarms aren't immune to jamming and replay attacks. In 2012/2013, I found that a Cooper iON alarm could be jammed and replayed, as it uses 1-waay RF and the protocol seems pretty legacy. What other 1-way alarms are on the market? Texecom is 2-way, Pyronix is 2-way, HKC is 2-way.

Casing big houses with Yale alarms.

Obviously you can't judge value of good inside from size of house, but there are several 5/6 bedroom houses in Ealing and Hounslow with Yale alarms.

Ah, ok. I mean, given that the jamming works (and works well), then I think that would be the attack chosen. Only downside to it is that you don't get confirmation the alarm is disarmed, you need to hope for the best. The replay is awkward as well, as capturing the signal requires you are there when the alarm is armed or disarmed (you can modify one signal to the other easily). That means planning, and the last few "psychology of a burglar" things I have read suggest there is rarely any planning beyond driving round the area beforehand.

They'd be in a pretty weak position, given they OKed me releasing the issues.

1. It's really not just Yale that have the issue. Anything that isn't 2-way suffers from the issue, including the graded stuff. If you take a look at a number of systems, they aren't 2-way. 2. The jammers are available from China for £50.

Not all signals you see are jammers, but the boxes the police are recovering are. 25W would be horrific in a built up area for these things. 500mW is already enough!

Find someone to do it for less...

In that instance, Domonial in a new build. They hadn't paid for maintenance, and were asking if I could recover the log from the panel. I can't even vaguelly work these panels out even with an engineers code. Quoted £500 to have a look but they weren't interested.

There's evidence of jammers being used a lot for car theft now, the police are finding them fairly regularly, and a few court cases have had them submitted as evidence. Basic jammers though, just sending a signal all of the time. Thing that is puzzling is that, as far as I know, the police haven't recovered any of the gizmos used to get past the more advanced security. Plenty of CCTV footage of thieves walking up to cars and stepping in though. Yep. Unfortunately the people who contacted me wanted me to look into it for free, so it was just emails back and forth. One of them, the problem was that they mentioned to the police the alarm was armed. This got put in the crime report, the insurers didn't believe them...

That's about the upper limit, but with a mix of £20s and £10s, normally a lot less. The ones in banks tend to be filled with more. Look at these muppets though - spent months digging a tunnel to net a couple of thousand: http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/mole-gang-dig-100ft-tunnel-679754

I dunno, the houses with them on are getting bigger and bigger, and some of the amazon reviews talk of big installs. The PIN etc, yeah, not likley. The jamming though, really easy, reliable and cheap. I'd love to say much more expensive alarms can't be jammed, but a fair few can. So far in the last 4 years, I've had 8 people approach me about break-ins without alarms going off. One of them I would definitely put down to mental health issues, one was a wired alarm, but the other 6 look credible. Hard to say really. Just think manufacturers should all be pulling their weight here, and now stuff is getting Internet connected, even more so. Videofied was terrible, as was Risco.

Last week I presented at IFSEC on the issues with wireless alarms, especially the cheap ones. It was received quite well, but we weren't allowed to name names. We've published a blog post about it now: https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/alarm-systems-alarmingly-insecure-oh-the-irony/ The short of it - easy to jam, easy to replay disarm signals, you can sniff the PIN over-the-air if you use a remote keypad, you can brute-force the PIN as well. I reported these issues to Yale 4 years ago. However, they seem to be getting more and more popular as time goes on.

Some of the outputs are pre-set to mirror other signals in the alarm.

The biggest problem by far is the small key compared to the code size, so I've kind of stopped looking into this one.

The same is true for encryption in some wireless systems. The receiver in the panel doesn't have the overhead to deal with a key per detector, so it just uses a single system wide key. That means all detectors, ever, use the same key...

Thanks. With a) it seems that the main issue is that customers could reset the panel when the ARC doesn't want them to. b) I suspect exactly the same algorithm is used in the panel as in the program. I think the algorithm was written for whatever 8-bit processor was used in those days. Might as well show the algorithm used, the only bit of it that needs to be secrete is the vector at the top which I have changed. I don't know if you know any programming or python, but it's really simple. # Taken from the data in the exe vector = [3,3,5,5,8,1,3,9,8,0,5,9,3,9,4,1,1,0,9,4,3,0,2,2,8,4,3,2,8,4,9,4,1,3,3,3,3,8,5,3,0,2,4,3,2,1,8,9,0,5,4,3,9,5,8,3,9,9,1,0,0,9,9,3,3,8,2, 1,4,9,1,4,9,2,9,0,9,5,3,9,5,3,3,5,9,1,0,2,9,3,2,1,2,9,8,0,4,9,4,2,3,9,4,0,1,8,5,3,3,9,9,1,0,5,9,3,8,9,4,8,4,2,3,1,0,3,9,4,8,2,0,4,3,3, 1,0,5,2,8,3,3,5,2,8,3,2,9,5,2,1,2,4,4,3,0,4,2,3,4,1,8,2,9,1,0,5,1,8,2,4,3,5,1,0,3,8,5,3,2,1,1,3,9,3,2,3,5,8,3,9,0,3,2,3,5,3,8,4,0,3,9, 1,9,3,0,2,9,3,8,1,4,2,8,4,0,1,9,1,0,1,2,1,3,5,3,3,9,0,2,1,4,1,2,3,4,3,4,9,5,3,5,9,3,1,3,9,4,0,3,2,3,3,4,4,2,1] def generate_reset(quote, version): i = 0 tens = 0 reset = [] while i <= 4 : j = 0 result = 0 while j <= 4: offset = (version + tens + quote[j]) % 256 result = result + vector[offset] tens = tens + 10 j = j + 1 reset.append(result%10) i = i + 1 return reset print(generate_reset(quote = [0,0,0,0,2], version=131)) Notice that there is no multiplication, division, or anything fancy. The % symbol means "modulus" which most people know as "remainder". So "% 256" means "divide by 256 and give me the remainder". You normally get this for free in a microcontroller - an 8-bit number is limited to 256 values, so it just wraps round anyway. Panel firmware would contain it - in fact, now that I know certain panels have it, I can find the long string of characters called "vector" in some of them. The problem with panel firmware is that it is very hard for me to work out what is data and what is code. In x86 exes, there are normally a lot more hints available to me. I can also easily run an x86 exe and step through the running code to see how it works. With a microcontroller in an alarm, I can't easily do this.

Tunstall are someone who Menvier took over who Cooper took over? If you can point me towards a program to generate them...

Precisely Joe. This is just an easy target to show that.

It's all part of learning. Nothing lost for a few hours work.

So I wonder what drove the standard to require that and where the 5-digit Technistore code fits in to this? There must have been some reason behind it being 5-digit - it's rarely seen as a code length. It's a combination of the long code and short key. The key allows 256 distinct mappings between the quote code and reset code. That means that 12345 quote can only map to at most 256 of the 100,000 possible output values. 999,744 of the outputs are not possible - our keyspace has been reduced hugely. Notice I say "at most 256". It is possible for 12345 to map to 98765 using one or more keys. In fact, 12345 could map to 98765 using all 256 keys, but then we wouldn't need to find out they key at all. So if you tell me the reset code and I know the quote code, it is highly likely that I can just guess the key. For a very limited number of quote/reset pairs, I get 2 possible keys (in fact, there are two combinations with 4). So more than 99% of the time, I just need a single quote/reset pair to work out the key. So normally I get something like: 12345/74643 - only possible key is 123 (99.25% of the time) Sometimes I get this: 23654/34234 - two possible keys 232 and 154 (about .75% of the time) 98747/37265 - one possible key 232 (about 99.25% of the time) It would be really unlikely to get this: 23654/34234 - two possible keys 232 and 154 (about .75% of the time) 91737/72764 - two possible keys 078 and 154 (about .75% of the time) (we know the key is 154 as it is the only common one) Vanishly small chance of this happening: 23654/34234 - two possible keys 232 and 154 (about .75% of the time) 73748/38377 - two possible keys 232 and 154 (about .75% of the time) 98747/37265 - one possible key 232 (about 99.25% of the time) I've just tested these by running every single possible combination of key and input code against the algorithm. Not in any detail - have started looking at Texecom. Not aware of Tunstall.